Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

State of Utah v. Richard Lynn Carlson : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.MARK A. BESENDORFER, D. GILBERT ATHAY; Attorneys
for AppellantROBERT B. HANSEN; Attorneys for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Carlson, No. 16582 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1844

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE---------------- 1
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT--------------------- 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL---------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS----------------------------- 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
IT IS WITHIN THE DISCRETION
OF THE TRIAL COURT TO DECIDE
THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR
A TECHlHCAL VIOLATION OF AH
ORDER EXCLUDING WITNESSES----- 4
POINT II:
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
FROM WHICH THE APPELLANT COULD
BE CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF
POSSESSION OF NARCOTICS WITH
THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE------ 12
CONCLUSION----------------------------------------- 20
CASES CITED
Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d
811 (1972)------------------------------~ampton v. People, 171 Colo. 153, 465 P.2d 394
(1970)----------------------------------Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91 (1893)-------~ichol v. Wall, 122 Utah 589, 253 P.2d 355 (1953)-?eople v. Francis, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591
(1969)----------------------------------?eople v. Newman, 95 Cal.Rptr. 12, 484 P.2d 1356
(1971)----------------------------------?etty v. People, 167 Colo. 248, 447 P.2d 217
(1968)----------------------------------Root v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 382, 334 S.W.2d 154
(1960)----------------------------------State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 514 P.2d 800
(1973)----------------------------------State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d
183 (1960)------------------------------State v. Berger, 13 wash.App. 974, 538 P.2d 533
(1975)-----------------------------------

12
7
6

10,18
16
15
16
6

16,18
10
7

-iSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page

State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State

v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
in

State v.
State v.
State v.
State
State
State
State
State
State
State

v.
v.
v.

State
State
State
State

·.;.
v.
v.
v.

v.
v.
v.

v.

Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 Pac. 480 (1928)-----Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975)----------Christean, 533 P.2d 872 (Utah 1975)---------Curtis, 114 Ariz. 527, 562 P.2d 407 (1977)--Daniels, 584 P.2d 800 (Utah 1978)-----------Dodge, 564 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977)-------------Floyd, 120 Ariz. 358, 586 P.2d 203 (1978)---Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1978)-----------the Interest of M.S., 584 P.2d 914 (Utah
1978)--------------------------------------John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978)--------------Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1976)-----~------Navarrette, 115 Ariz. 574, 566 P.2d 1050
(1977)-------------------------------------Ortiz, 88 N.M. 370, 540 P.2d 850 (1975)-----Presley, 110 Ariz. 46, 514 P.2d 1234 (1973)-Sanchez, Utah, No. 16103, May 8, 1980-------Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970)--Simpson, 541 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1975)----------Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936)-----Smith, 15 Wash.App. 716, 552 P.2d 1059
(1976)-------------------------------------Vaughan, 554 P.2d 210 (Utah 1976)-----------Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959)----Wilson, 565 P. 2d 66 (Utah 1977) -------------Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872 (1964)-

5
6
19
16
13
5I7I11

15
13

13
14
13
11
7

10
5
14
10
4,12
15
5
10
13
16

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (1953), as
amended------------------------------------Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-4 (Supp. 1975)------------------

-iiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1
5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16582 & 16583

RICHARD LYNN CARLSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with two counts of possession
of a controlled substance (heroin and marijuana) with intent
to distribute for value, in violation of Utah Code Annotated
§

53-37-8 (1) (a) (ii)

(1953), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before the Third Judicial District
2ou~t,
:o~nd

stance

the Honorable Peter F. Leary, sitting without a jury, and
guilty of both counts of possession of a controlled sub~ith

sen~enced

8ne

:ro~

intent to distribute for value.

Appellant was

on July 25, 1979, to two concurrent terms in prison,

O to 5 years and the other from 0 to 15 years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgments of
the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THF FACTS
Although respondent is in substantial agreement wit:.
appellant's statement of facts, the record reveals the

foll~:

additional facts which are pertinent to the resolution of

t~

issues presented on appeal.
First, appellant had been under surveillance and
suspected of illegal drug-related activity for two months
prior to the execution of the search warrant.

(Tr. 8, Vol. 1).

Second, items other than pistols, and quantities of
marijuana and heroin were found during the search of

appell~t

bedroom, including many items used in the production and sale
of drugs, e.g. substances identified as cutting agents for
heroin, a plastic bag sealing device and plastic bags the size
used to bag "lids" of marijuana, a balance scale capable of
weighing minute quantities of substances, other measuring
devices (spoons, funnels).

(Tr. 13, 14, 20, 40, 41, Vol. 1).

Third, appellant's bare reference to Deputy George's
opinion testimony is misleading in its failure to note the
~eputy's

based.

substantial experience upon which that opinion was
Deputy George had been an undercover narcotic officer,

which included joining the drug culture, buying drugs for a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

predetermined amount of time and,at the conclusion of the undercover
work, bringing his cases to Court (Tr.7, Vol.l).

Deputy George's

training in narcotics work included schooling at the University
of Utah and at the police acadamy.

Because of his knowledge

and experience he had prepared a sheriff's office manual on
narcotics usage and identification (Tr. 15, 16, 37, vol. 2).
With this background in mind, Deputy George's testimony that
the amount of narcotics found in appellant's bedroom indicated
a

na~cotics

(Tr.

sales operation should be accorded great weight.

38, 49-51, Vol.

2).

Fourth Mr. Jerry Campbell, Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney, denied under oath having had the discussion with
police officers during the morning break to which appellant
testified.

(Tr. 89, Vol. 1).

by Officer Donald Bird

This testimony was corroborated

(Tr. 108, 109, Vol. 1).

Mr. Campbell

did testify that a conversation was held in his office with
the evidence custodians relating to the chain problem during
the noon recess.

There were some other officers milling

around in the office, and there was quite a bit of confusion
at that time in Mr. Campbell's office.

(Tr. 90, Vol. 1).

Officer Allen Sawaya, one of the evidence custodians, testified that such conversation was very minor, consisting only
of .'1r. Campbell telling '"Jfficer Sawaya to make sure he (Sawaya)
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•

had the chain of evidence down (Tr. 121, Vol. 1) .

The other

evidence custodian, Donald Bird, testified that he did not
recall the specifics of the conversation between himself and
Mr. Campbell during the lunch hour regarding chain problems
(Tr. 108, Vol. 1).
ARGUMENT
IT IS WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL
COURT TO DECIDE THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
FOR A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF AN ORDER
EXCLUDING WITNESSES.
In State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936),
this court considered whether, under an order excluding all
witnesses from the courtroom except the one presently
testifying, the trial court abused his discretion by permittin:
a witness to testify who was in the courtroom while another
~itness

testified.

The Court specifically held that it is

\,·i thin the discretion of the trial court to decide the remedy
for violating an exclusion order:
It is a matter within the sound discretion
of the trial judge as to whether a witness
who has been present during part or all of
the examination of any other witness should
be permitted to testify in the face of an
exclusion order.
61 P.2d at 1116.
Smith, supra, has never been overruled, and its logical basis,
~hich

still obtains today, is discussed below.
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The Utah rule for excluding witnesses is found
in Utah Code Ann.

(Supp. 1975),

§

78-7-4:

. . . in any cause the court may, in its
discretion, during the examination of a
witness, exclude any and all witnesses in
the cause (emphasis added).
It is important to note that the statute says that the court
"may" rather than that the court "must" exclude witnesses.
The Utah Supreme Court supports this construction.

In State

v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480 (1928) the court held that
a trial court may refuse to grant a request to exclude and
that there is no absolute right to have any witnesses excluded.
In the recent case of State v. Sanchez, No. 16103 (Utah May 8,
1980) , this Court noted:
We have no doubt that in its inherent
powers as the authority in control of
the trial the court could exclude witnesses in any case where it appears
there is good cause for doing so; and
for the same reason he nay properly
direct that witnesses not talk to each
other or to others during the trial.
Advanced Sheet at 2 (emphasis added).
This Court has also determined that whether the exclusion
rule has been violated "is within the sound discretion of the
trial court."

State v. Dodge, 564 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977); see

also State v. Vaughan, 554 P.2d 210 (Utah 1976).
Certainly if a trial court has the discretion to
allow a witness who remaine.9_ in the courtroom and who heard

-5-
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all or part of the testimony of another witness to testify,
it should have the discretion, in the face of an exclusion
order, to examine any possible violation of that order,
and determine what,if any prejudice has occurred, what, if
any prejudice might occur if the "violating" witness should
testify, and take appropriate action if any.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it will not dis:
any decision within the discretion of a trial court unless
there is a clear showing of arbitrary and capricious abuse of
tha:. discretion.

State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).

The presumption is that such discretion was properly exercise:
Root v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 382, 334 S.W. 2d 154, 157 (1960)
In the instant case, there was no showing that the trial court
arbitrarily and capriciously abused his discretion in permitL
the witnesses to testify when there had been a violation of
~he

exclusion rule.

The trial court held a hearinq, determine

what, if any prejudice might result and judged, in his
sound discretion, that the witness could appropriately testiL
The basic rule for accepting or excluding the
testimony of a witness who has violated the exclusionary rule
was set forth in Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, (1893):
If a witness disobeys an order of withdrawel, while he may be proceeded against
for contempt, and his testimony is open
to comment to the jury by reason of his
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conduct, he is not thereby disqualified,
and the weight of authority is that he
cannot be excluded on that ground merely,
although the right to exclude under
particular circumstances may be supported
as within the sound discretion of the
trial court.
Id. at 91

(emphasis added)

The invocation of the rule excluding and sequestering witnesses
is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Dodge, supra.

State v.

Further, enforcement of the rule fashioning

an appropriate remedy for a violation, and determining whether
a violation is prejudicial to the defendant lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court.

State v. Ortiz, 88 N.M.

370, 540 P.2d 850 (1975); Hampton v. People, 171 Colo. 153,
465 P.2d 394
P.2d 533

(1970); State v. Berger, 13 Wash. App. 974, 538

(1975).
At the beginning of the trial in the instant case,

on motion of counsel for appellant, the trial court invoked
the exclusionary rule excluding all witnesses from the courtroom, and admonished the witnesses not to discuss their
testimony about the case with anyone outside (Tr.5,6,Vol.l).
After the noon recess, counsel for appellant called appellant

~o the witness stand.

Appellant was sworn and testified

that he had heard State's attorney, Jerry Campbell, discussing

t~e case with several police officers, witnesses for the
State, outside the courtroom during the morning recess.

-7-
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Appellant textified that Mr. Campbell walked over to the
officers seated on a bench and talked to them about the
necessary chain of evidence:
chain."

(Tr.84,Vol.l).

Mr.

ttWe've got to establish a
Campbell was sworn, and denied

that the conversation related by appellant had occurred.
Hr. Campbell's testimony was corroborated by Officer
Donald Bird.
Mr. Campbell did have a conversation with the
evidence custodians in his office relating to the chain
problems during the noon recess while many other officers
were milling

around causing confusion.

One of the

evidence custodians, Allen Sawaya, testified that such
conversation was very minor, while the other evidence
custodian, Donald Bird, testified that he was in the room
but did not even recall the specifics of the conversation.
The trial court noted that the ordinary circumstana
would be that Mr. Campbell certainly might discuss
individually with the witnesses what their testimony might
be, but that such discussion with two witnesses together was
a violation of the exclusionary rule.

The trial court

permitted the evidence to continue, however, subject to
appellant's motion to strike.

The motion to strike was

later denied.
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Having personally heard the testimony of
all concerned,the trial court was able to judge the
demeanor, the candor, the memory, etc., of the
witnesses, and was able to weigh the possible
prejudice, if any.

After the full complete hearing

the judge appropriately allowed the chain of
possession testimony.

-9-
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This Court has pointed out many times:
A finder of fact is not necessarily
bound to accept as conclusive a testimony
of a witness.
His credibility may be
impeached by self-interest or improbability
so that it would be entirely within the realm
of reason to discount or to entirely discredit
it.
Nichol v. Wall, 122 Utah 589, 253 P.2d 355, 356

(1953).

The appellate court must view whatever inferences
may be fairly and reasonably drawn from the evidence in
light most favorable to the verdict (judgment).

t~

State v.

Simpson, 541 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1975); State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2i
34, 347 P.2d 865
208, 357 P.2d 183

(1959);
(1960).

State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d
Here, it is a fair and reasonable

inference that the trial court believed Mr. Campbell's
testimony that the alleged conversation between him and
the police officer witnesses allegedly overheard by appellant
did not in fact occur, and that the conversation had between
!'Ir.

Ca.rnpbell and the evidence custodians during the noon

recess was only a technical violation of the exclusionary
rule.
The case of State v. Presley, 110 Ariz. 46, 514
P.2d 1234 (1973), presented a factual situation similar to
that in the instant case.

There the witnesses were sworn,

admonished to remain outside of the courtroom, and also
admonished to refrain from discussing any of the facts of
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the case among themselves or with anyone else except
the attorneys.

The county attorney was aware of the

exclusion order.

Nevertheless, on the second day of

trial, he got two prosecution witnesses together into
his office and went over their testimony in the presence
of each other.

The Arizona Supreme Court specifically

held that since the granting of the sequestration of
witnesses was within the discretion of the trial court,
and since the judge could have refused the invocation of
the rule, a fortiori he could excuse a partial violation
of it.

Even now, although Arizona has changed its rule and

requires the exclusion of witnesses on request of counsel,
discretion remains in the trial court to determine what
sanctions, if any, are necessary for a violation of the
rule excluding witnesses.
574, 566 P.2d 1050

State v. Navarrette, 115 Ariz.

(1977).

Appellant would rely on Dodge, supra, as authority
to support the proposition that where a motion to strike
or exclude the violating witnesses' testimony is made, as
was the case here, such motions represent the only remedies
for a violation by a witness of the exclusionary rule.
This is a distortion of the Dodge decision.

Nowhere in the

Dodge uecision does this Court suggest that a trial court
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is without discretion in fashioning the remedy it
considers proper for a witnesses' violation of the
exclusionary rule.

As the Utah Supreme Court stated

in Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d 811 (Utah 1972):
Where the trial is to the court,
the rulings upon the admissibility of
evidence are not required to be so
strict, nor are they of such critical
importance as where the trial is to
the jury.
This is so because it is
assumed that the trial judge has
superior knowledge as to the competence
and effect which should be given evidence,
and that he will make his findings and
d-cisions in conformity therewith.
Id. at 814.
Respondent submits that since the sequestration
of witnesses in Utah is a matter within the sound discretion
of the trial court, and that since the trial court could
have refused the invocation of the rule, the trial court
in his sound discretion could excuse a violation of the

ru~.

State v. Smith, supra.
POINT II
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDElJCE FROI1 1\FHICH
THE APPELLANT COULD BE CONVICTED OF THE
CRIME OF POSSESSION OF lJARCOTICS WITH THE
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE.
It is well established in Utah that in order for
a convicted defendant to succeec in challenging the
sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he must establish

-12-
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that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime.

State v.

Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978); State v. Wilson, 565
P.2d 66

(Utah 1977); State v. Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah

1976).

Such cases also establish that in considering

insufficiency of the evidence in cases with conflicting
evidence, this Court must assume that the trier of fact
believed those aspects of the evidence supporting the
verdict, and also drew the reasonable inferences therefrom
which support the verdict.
. . we are obliged to assume on
appeal that the jury believed those
aspects of the evidence which support
the verdict; and that, in doing so, there
is a reasonable basis therein upon which
the jury could believe that the defendant
committed that offense as charged.
State v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064 at 1065-1066 (Utah 1978).
See also State in the Interest of M.S., 584 P.2d 914 (Utah
1978), establishing that the same principle applies to
bench trials.
The reason for the rule, of course, is that
the finder of fact is best able and legally responsible
· d ge t h e d emeanor of
t o JU

~i·tnesses,
n

determine who is

telling the truth, determine the weight to be given to
the testimony of each witness, etc.
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Appellant argues that the evidence did not
exclude every reasonable hypothesis.
24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246

In State v. Schad,

(1970), this Court

reaffirmed the proposition that a conviction can be
had on circumstantial evidence if it excludes every
reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant.
The Court went on to state:
Unless upon our review of the evidence,
and the reasonable inferences fairly to be
deduced therefrom, it appears that there
was no reasonable basis therein for such a
conclusion, we should not overturn the
verdict.
Id. at 247.
Surveying the evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment, it cannot be said
that a reasonable finder of fact would necessarily entertain some substantial doubt of appellant's guilt.
In State v. John, 586 P.2d 410

(Utah 1978), this

Court required that the reasonable hypothesis must flow
from substantial,credible evidence:
Consequently, if there is any reasonable
view of the credible evidence which is
reconcilable with the defendant's innocence,
it would naturally follow that there would
be a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
But
we emphasize that this does not mean just
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any view of any of the evidence, however
unsubstantial or incredible, which a
party to such a controversy may dream up.
The proper application of that rule
requires that it be based upon .
substantial and credible evidence.
This is
true.because in performing their [its] duty
as finders of the fact, they are the exclusive
judges of the credibility of the evidence.
In so doing they [he) may consider all of
the facts affirmatively shown, as well as
any unexplained areas, and draw whatever
inferences may fairly and reasonably be
drawn therefrom in the light of their own
experience and judgment.
Id. at 412

(emphasis added).
In the instant case, the only issue was whether

the appellant intended to distribute the controlled
substances,or some part thereof, for value.

The

following evidence clearly supports the court's findings.
First, appellant constructively possessed the
controlled substances.

Courts have generally held that

constructive possession may be proved by circumstantial
evidence.

State v. Floyd, 120 Ariz. 358, 586 P.2d 203

(1978); State v. Smith, 15 Wash.App. 716, 552 P.2d
1059

(1976); People v. Newman, 95 Cal.Rptr. 12, 484

P.2d 1356 (1971).

The Utah Supreme Court has detennined

that the dominion and control of narcotics necessary to
establish unlawful possession of narcotics neither means
t~at

the 6rug be found on the person of the accused nor

-15-
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that the accused must have had sole and exclusive
of the narcotic.

possessi~

State v. Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396

P.2d 872 (1964); State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 514
P.2d800

(1973).
Convictions for unlawful possession of controlled

substances may be based upon evidence that the controlled
substance(s), while not found on the person of the
defendant, was in a place under his dominion and control.
Petty v. People, 167 Colo. 248, 447 P.2d 217

(1968).

Similarly, the California Supreme Court has held that
"the accused has constructive possession when he maintains
control or right to control the contraband," and that
"possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in
a location which is irrunediately and exclusively accessible
to the accused and subject to his dominion and control" or
which is subject to the joint dominion and control of the
accused and another.

People v. Francis, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199,

450 P.2d 591 (1969).

The Supreme Court of Arizona has

determined, in State v. Curtis, 114 Ariz. 527, 562 P.2d
407

(1977), that constructive possession is sufficiently

established by proof that a defendant exercised control or
right to control over the substance itself or the place
in which the illegal substance was found.

The controlled

substances were found in a search of the appellant's bed~~
in the instant case, which bedroom was undisputedly under
appellant's control or which he had a right to control.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

The search of appellant's bedroom yielded
substantial quantities of marijuana and heroin.

The search

also yielded chemical substances identified by Deputy
George as cutting agents for heroin, a plastic bag
sealing device similar to such devices commonly used in
the drug trafficking business to hermetically seal
quantities of controlled substances, a balance scale
capable of weighing minute quantities of substances,
other measuring devices (spoons and funnels).

The

heroin was found inside an aerosol spray can with a
false bottom.
In drawing fair and reasonable inferences
from the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, the only logical result is that appellant
possessed the controlled substances.

It is also the

only reasonable inference that appellant intended to
distribute the controlled substances for value.
Deputy George testified of his work as an undercover
narcotic's officer and of his special training in
narcotics work.

George gave as his opinion that the

heroin and marijuana found in appellant's bedroom were
large

a,~ounts

for sale, and not for personal use, that

the heroin was in a quantity extremely large even for
a heroin addict, and that a recent drug-selling trend
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in the Salt Lake area was towards hermetically sealed
packages of heroin, such as were found in appellant's
bedroom.
The drug measuring and packaging devices
also point

directly and solely to distribution.

A

user does not have to package the drugs he has just
purchased, which are already packaged by the seller.

Also,

the user does not need to precisely measure the quantities
he is using.

Appellant places much emphasis on the

testimony of Bill Jenkins, a defense witness and friend
of appellant, to the effect that he (Jenkins) had left the
aerosol can containing the packets of heroin at appellant's
residence before the search; however, Jenkins did not

also~

left the heroin cutting chemicals, the packaging device, the
packaging materials, the marijuana, etc.

The trial court

is not required to accept as conclusive the testimony of
a witness.

Nichol v. Wall, supra.

The trial court obviousi'

gave far more weight to the testimony of Officer George
which reasonably explained all of the facts, than to
that of the defense witnesses, which left totally unexplainei
the cutting and packaging paraphernalia.
This Court, in State v. Bankhead, 514 P.2d 800
(Utah 1973), held:

-18Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Circwnstantial evidence may be used
to prove that the accused possessed the
narcotics for sale rather than for his
individual use.
The quanitity of the
heroin involved and the nature of its
packaging may support the inference that
it was possessed for sale rather than for
his personal use.
Experienced officers may
give their opinions in cases involving
possession of heroin that the narcotics are
held for purposes of sale based upon such
matters as the quantity, packaging, and
normal use of an individual; convictions
based on such testimony have been upheld.
Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
When the total evidentiary picture is viewed, the
trial court was properly within its authority in finding
appellant guilty.

The language of the Utah Supreme Court

in State v. Christean, 533 P.2d 872 (Utah 1975), is
appropriate:
. the law does not require
that the separate bits of evidence be
viewed in isolation for it is proper
to take whatever fragments of proof
that can be found and piece them together
with the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom in order to fill in the whole
mosaic of the crime.
Id. at 876.
The trial court, having considered all the evidence
and having made all "the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom" was able to weigh "the whole mosaic of the
crir:ie," and by deliberating with the full picture in mind,
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determined that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
COlJCLUSIOH
Whether or not witnesses are excluded from a
trial is within the discretion of the trial court.

If

some technical violation of an order excluding witnesses
occurs, it is certainly within the discretion of the court
to fashion an appropriate remedy if necessary.

The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a witness
to the mere chain of custody to testify after a possible,
non-prejudicial violation of an exclusion order.
The evidence of the large quantity of drugs and
concomitant processing and packaging devices possessed by
appellant were well sufficient to support the court's
guilty verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
OLGA AGNELLO-RASPA
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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